


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Soviet Developments

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 May 1972

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

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The Summit: Stress on Substance

Enjoying a fresh mandate for his policies from the CPSU Central Committee, Brezhnev almost immediately seized the leading role in substantive discussions with President Nixon. Nevertheless, his solo encounters with the President have been balanced with meetings including Premier Kosygin and Podgorny. The attendance at the Kremlin dinner by all twelve Moscow-resident Politburo members is unprecedented for a non-Communist head of state (De Gaulle--3, Pompidou and Sadat--5 each). This underscores the importance of the visit and presents an image of unanimity and collectivity.

In keeping with joint emphasis on concrete achievements and substantive talks, Brezhnev and the President held their first session a scant two hours after the latter's arrival on Monday. In the same vein, banquet toasts that evening generally gave short shrift to niceties and instead bluntly addressed the potential significance of the talks and the issues dividing the two sides.

With a number of agreements already negotiated or nearly complete before the summit, the leaders decided the first day to publicize them as they were signed. Agreements on joint action against disease and for environmental protection were announced on 23 May; agreements on a joint space venture and scientific and technological cooperation are expected today. Press reports suggest that trade agreements will be announced on Thursday and a SALT agreement on Friday.

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Initial Soviet Comment on German Treaty Ratification

Soviet media reaction to the ratification of Bonn's Eastern treaties has been generally bland. As expected, the Soviets have praised the treaties and their own role in securing ratification. Each article repeats the generality that the treaties will facilitate positive changes in Europe, but specific improvements are not mentioned.

Some of the Soviet commentators give passing notice to the difficulty of the ratification struggle within West Germany but do not elaborate on the details of that struggle. Opposition is generally portrayed as coming from a small group of revanchist obstructionists. The CDU as an entity is not criticized, possibly because Moscow realizes that, given the situation in Bonn, it may soon be necessary to establish a good working relationship with the CDU.

The Soviet press so far has not discussed the controversial Bundestag resolution on the treaty or the prickly question of the Soviet response to it, although the existence of the resolution was noted in a TASS international broadcast. Even this notice was oblique and slanted, with TASS quoting part of a West German press agency report to the effect that the resolution "does not make any changes in the rights and duties following from the treaties and corresponds to the letter and spirit of the treaties."

Although Soviet media have made only passing reference to the Bundestag resolution, Soviet diplomats are highly incensed. Soviet Embassy counselor Bogomolov maintains that Moscow will not recognize the text, which he describes as "good only to be nailed up in my toilet." He claims that the CDU/CSU decision to abstain in the Bundestag vote relieved the USSR of any moral obligation to respond. Bogomolov angrily told that "they (the Germans) have actually spit in our faces" and that "we will do everything to keep Brandt as chancellor and the German Fascists out of power."

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June 3 Appears Likely Date for Signature of the
Final Berlin Protocol

Brezhnev told US officials today that the Supreme Soviet will ratify the treaty with the FRG on 31 May, adding that the Berlin protocol then should be signed. Brezhnev readily agreed to Secretary Rogers' suggestion of 3 June and argued strongly against any further delay. The protocol is to be signed in Berlin by the four foreign ministers, just before Chancellor Brandt leaves to deliver a speech at Harvard commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Douglas-Home and Schumann have yet to accept 3 June, but neither appears to have commitments elsewhere.

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Soviet Press Virtually Ignoring Vietnam

Soviet media coverage of Indochina developments has fallen off markedly since late last week. The Soviets continue to issue a few routine battlefield reports, but the last significant Soviet commentary on Vietnam appeared on 21 May. The *Pravda* editorial issued that day contained a reaffirmation of support for Vietnam, and an accompanying article noted that any improvement in Soviet-US relations "would not be at the expense of any third countries or peoples." Not surprisingly, the Soviets have ignored recent North Vietnamese statements denouncing the President for "every day and every hour sowing disunity in the socialist camp" and criticizing British and "certain Western circles" attempts to internationalize the Vietnam issue.

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UN Secretary General Waldheim to the USSR in July

The UN announced Monday that Secretary General Waldheim will visit the USSR for several days in mid-July, fulfilling the pledge made when he entered office 1 January to go to the capitals of the five permanent members during his first year as SYG. Waldheim has visited Washington, Paris, and London; arrangements for him to go to Peking reportedly are being made and could be announced in the near future. The Moscow talks probably will be largely a *tour d'honneur* after the summit. In addition, Waldheim may opt to place special emphasis on the Middle East and the UN role in the search for peace in the region. He is pushing for a UN-sponsored Middle East peace conference, leaving open the question of superpower participation.

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USSR-EC

Recent gleanings in Moscow suggest that the Soviets are willing to resort to veiled threats to try to prevent united European Community policies toward the East. They are also still trying to discourage the development of relations between the EC and China.

Premier Kosygin recently asked the French finance minister how "other countries could follow developments" in the Community. To his tentative answer that an "observer" in Brussels might be called for, Kosygin noted that any such observer would represent CEMA, which would be the instrument eventually to negotiate trade agreements with France and the other EC countries. Kosygin's emphasis on Moscow's wish to continue to deal with the individual members of the Community rather than the EC as such was backed up by the warning that France's "special privileges" deriving from its bilateral arrangements with the USSR would have to be reconsidered should agreements with the EC supplant bilateral dealings.

The concern over the Chinese was illustrated by a query from a Soviet Foreign Ministry official to a colleague about "rumors" that China would send an observer to Brussels. The official said EC acceptance of an observer from Peking would be an "unfriendly act."

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Friendship Treaty with Bangladesh Probably Not
Imminent

Since shortly after the December war, there have been occasional reports of discussions regarding a Soviet friendship treaty with Bangladesh. The latest of these

claims that Bangladesh will conclude a 20-year treaty with the USSR similar to the Soviet-Indian treaty signed last August. According to this report, the treaty will not be negotiated until after Premier Kosygin visits Bangladesh, and no date for this visit has been set.

The report seems plausible. The Soviets would welcome a treaty with Bangladesh, although they probably are not pushing the issue at this time. The Soviets are anxious that the Pakistanis, Indians, and Bengalis sort out the problems remaining from the December war, and reportedly have urged all parties to the conflict to make the concessions necessary to get negotiations under way. A Soviet-Bangladesh treaty now would provide Pakistan another excuse to stall such negotiations. Moreover, it might harm Moscow's presently warm relations with New Delhi. The Indians were annoyed with Soviet efforts to ingratiate themselves with the Bengalis and are determined to remain the predominant foreign influence in Bangladesh.

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